Agents in the SIEM

Your SOC sees the login. It can't see the agent.

Sending Cortex Agent traces, usage and data access into Microsoft Sentinel.

Kevin Keller ยท kevinkeller.org

Why it matters

Detection and audit already live in your SIEM

Anomaly detection and audit are two of the five controls every agent platform needs. For many Snowflake customers in Europe, the place they live is Microsoft Sentinel.

Agents don't need a new security stack. They need to show up in the one you already run.

The blind spot

The native connector stops at SQL

CoveredNot covered
Logins, queries, grants, roles, users, tablesAI_OBSERVABILITY_EVENTS (agent traces)
CORTEX_AGENT_USAGE_HISTORY (tokens, credits)
ACCESS_HISTORY (objects and columns touched)

What Snowflake records

Three sources answer the responder's questions

  • The trace: every turn as spans, from planning and tool calls to the answer
  • The bill: tokens, credits, model and region per request
  • The data: which objects and columns each statement read, now with agents_info

Who asked what, what did the agent do, what did it touch, what did it cost?

The idea

Two paths, one workspace

Keep the native connector. Add a small pipeline for the three AI sources, via the Azure Monitor Logs Ingestion API.

The build

Four steps from blind spot to detection

  1. Grants: MONITOR on the agent, on a dedicated audit role
  2. Native connector: install the Snowflake solution from Content Hub
  3. AI pipeline: one Azure provisioning script, one small Python uploader, three custom tables
  4. KQL: correlate and detect

The privacy decision

Unredacted content is a choice, not a default

  • Metadata only: tool names, latency, model, tokens, errors
  • With READ UNREDACTED: prompts, tool inputs and outputs, answers
  • No role has it by default, not even PUBLIC
  • For many European organisations: metadata in the SIEM, full trace kept in Snowflake

Correlation

Three keys tie it together

KeyJoins
SESSION_IDAgent session โ†” native login and query tables
QUERY_IDSQL statement โ†” objects and columns touched
REQUEST_IDAgent request โ†” tokens and credits

From an alert on a sensitive table back to the conversation that caused it.

Know the latencies

Not every source is real time

  • Agent traces: available quickly
  • ACCESS_HISTORY: around three hours
  • CORTEX_AGENT_USAGE_HISTORY: up to a day
  • Native connector: about two hours

Write detections that tolerate late data.

Before production

What to change first

  • Run as the audit role, not ACCOUNTADMIN, with key-pair or workload identity
  • Pull incrementally with a high-water mark, on a schedule
  • Carry agents_info and agent_type to tell human from agent queries
  • Cover every agent, and set retention to match the redaction decision

The takeaway

Turn an agent from an invisible user into something your SOC can investigate.

Read the full article

Personal "art of the possible" project, not an official Snowflake or Microsoft solution