AI agent security

Production agents should be unable to misbehave, by design

A containment architecture where security is structural, not aspirational.

Kevin Keller · kevinkeller.org

Why it matters

LLM judgement is not a security control

  • Generic agents get Bash, file access, web fetching and MCP.
  • They can run any command, read any file and call any discovered tool.
  • That works for development. In production it is a liability.
Not "can the agent do the right thing?" but "can the agent do the wrong thing?"

Sandboxes are not enough

A sandbox limits where damage happens, not whether

  • Inside the sandbox the agent still has a shell and dynamic tool discovery.
  • A tricked agent can still exfiltrate through an allowed network path.
  • An MCP server can add tools after the sandbox was reviewed.

A perimeter around an unbounded capability set.

Layer 1: the custom agent

It can only do what its code allows

  • Tools are a fixed set of functions, for example three.
  • No shell tool, no file tool, no general HTTP tool.
  • The runtime rejects any hallucinated tool call.
  • A fixed tool set makes the agent fully integration-testable.

The idea

Not a guardrail. The absence of capability.

Build the agent fit for purpose, then add the sandbox as defence in depth.

Layer 2: the container

Network, files and resources are bounded

DestinationAllowed
Inference proxyYes
Platform APIYes
Public internetNo
Internal services, other containersNo

Read-only /app, limited /tmp, resource limits, immutable signed images.

Layer 3: the inference proxy

One control plane for every prompt

  • Prompt policy: fast pattern matching, then a judge model, to block, warn or log
  • FinOps: tokens per agent and team, budgets, anomaly alerts
  • Observability: latency, errors, model degradation
  • Audit: every prompt, response and policy result in one place

Combined

No single layer is sufficient

ThreatAgentContainerProxy
Code executionNo shell toolNo shellNone
ExfiltrationNo HTTP toolEgress blockedPattern detection
Prompt injectionFixed tools limit impactNonePolicy engine
Runaway costsScoped toolsResource limitsBudget quotas

In sequence

Each layer catches what the last one missed

  1. The agent cannot run arbitrary commands.
  2. If it could, the network would not let it reach unintended destinations.
  3. If the network allowed it, the proxy would block the malicious prompt.

Checklist highlights

Where to start

  • A fixed, enumerated tool set with input validation.
  • Egress only to the inference proxy and the platform API.
  • All inference through the proxy, with cost attribution and logging.
  • An evaluation suite in CI, agent identity in the identity provider, least privilege.

The takeaway

Build agents that cannot misbehave, because you didn't give them the tools to.

Read the full article

Kevin Keller · kevinkeller.org